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Large blocks of stock play an important role in many studies of corporate governance and finance.
Despite this important role, there is no standardized data set for these blocks, and the best available
data source, Compact Disclosure, has many mistakes and biases. In this paper, we document these
mistakes and show how to fix them. The mistakes and bias tend to increase with the level of reported
blockholdings: in firms where Compact Disclosure reports that aggregate blockholdings are greater
than 50 percent, these aggregate holdings are incorrect more than half the time and average holdings
for these incorrect firms are overstated by almost 30 percentage points. We also demonstrate that
our fixes are economically and statistically significant in an analysis of the relationship between firm
value and outside blockholders.
Jennifer Dlugosz
Department of Economics












Graduate School of Business
















   3
 
I. Introduction 
Large-block shareholders play an important role in corporate governance.  For this 
reason, the presence of such “blockholders” and the size of their holdings is a common 
explanatory variable in financial research.  In just the last few years, a representative sample 
of such studies includes analyses of the role of blockholders in executive turnover, executive 
compensation, firm diversification, discretionary expenses, market liquidity, and corporate 
performance.
1  Furthermore, blockholder data is a crucial input in the analysis of the 
relationship between ownership structure and firm value, where seminal works by Demsetz 
and Lehn (1985) and Morck et al. (1988) gave rise to a vast and growing literature.  
Despite the common use of large shareholder data, there does not exist a clean off-
the-shelf database to facilitate research.  Many of the papers cited above required their 
authors to gather their own data.  This time-consuming task is necessary because of several 
weaknesses in the available databases.  Of course, decentralized data gathering causes 
duplication of effort and lack of standardization across projects.  Also, because of the large 
time commitment necessary to clean the data for each firm, most researchers have gathered 
data for a relatively small number of firms. This paper aims to fill this data gap by 
documenting the problems with the currently available data, proposing a consistent set of 
solutions to these problems, and making a “clean” database freely available to all 
researchers.
2  Furthermore, we demonstrate the superiority of clean (vs. raw) data with a 
representative study on the relationship between outside blockholders and firm value.    
                                                 
1 For examples of papers on these listed topics, see Denis et. al (1997), Ryan and Wiggins (2001), Anderson et. 
al (2000), Ang et. al (2000), Singh and Davidson (2003), Heflin and Shaw (2000), Cremers and Nair (2004), 
and Shivdasani (1993). 
2 The database can be downloaded from http://finance.wharton.upenn.edu/~metrick/data.htm.  
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The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (SEA) lays out the ownership disclosure 
requirements for public corporations in Regulation 14A and Schedule 14A.  Virtually 
everything we know about blockholders in the United States comes from these disclosure 
requirements, which are described in detail in Appendix A of this paper. The two main types 
of data produced by the SEA are for holdings (once per year, reported in the annual proxy 
statement), and for transactions by corporate insiders and beneficial owners (updated through 
Forms 3, 4 and 5).  While the trading data would appear to provide the most current and 
comprehensive information, past research has demonstrated that this data is difficult to work 
with and cannot be relied upon to infer the holdings of individual blockholders (Anderson 
and Lee (1997a and 1997b), Jeng et al. (2003)).  Thus, we focus in this paper on the annual 
proxy data, which is more reliable and more commonly used by researchers.   
Proxy data is available from many sources, including direct electronic access using 
the SEC’s “Edgar” tool for all corporate filings since the mid-1990s.  For large-scale data 
downloads, however, it is necessary to use a commercial product.  The most widely used 
product is the Compact Disclosure database of Standard & Poor’s.  Anderson and Lee (1997a 
and 1997b) focus their analysis on the holdings of corporate officers and directors, and show 
that Compact Disclosure accurately reproduces the information in proxy statements for all 
firms except those with multiple classes of stock.  While Compact Disclosure also 
reproduces data on blockholders from the tables in the proxy statement, there are additional 
problems with these data.  We discuss these problems and their solutions in Section II, and 
summarize the changes for a large sample of firms from 1996 to 2001.  
In Section III, we perform a representative study using both raw Compact Disclosure 
data and a “clean” data set where these problems have been fixed.    We find that the raw  
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data is much noisier: in annual regressions of Tobin’s Q on outside blockholder ownership 
and other control variables, the clean data set is far more likely to yield statistically 
significant point estimates for the ownership variables.  Section IV summarizes our 
conclusions. Two appendices supplement the text.  Appendix A provides details on the 1934 
SEA and the disclosure requirements it created, and Appendix B provides details on the 
construction of our sample. 
  
II.  Data 
A. Sample Firms 
Our initial sample of firms consists of firms that are covered by the Investor 
Responsibility Research Center (IRRC) for both their publication Corporate Takeover 
Defenses (Rosenbaum 1995, 1998, 2000) and their director’s database which provides details 
on the board of directors for about 1,500 of the largest U.S. companies. The IRRC’s universe 
is drawn from the Standard & Poor’s (S&P) 500 as well as the annual lists of the largest 
corporations in the publications of Fortune, Forbes, and Businessweek.  We use the IRRC 
sample as a starting point because a wide range of governance data is available for this group 
of companies and our goal is to make this set of data as comprehensive as possible for this 
group.
3  A special subset of the IRRC companies – less than 10 percent in all years – have 
multiple classes of common stock.  For these companies, Anderson and Lee (1997a) showed 
there are many problems with the Compact Disclosure data, and these problems are very 
difficult to fix. In this paper, we eliminate all multiple-class companies from the database and 
                                                 
3 The IRRC data has been used as a starting point by Gompers et al. (2003), Cremers and Nair (2004), and 
Gillan et al. (2003).  
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start with the approximately 1300 firms per year (7,873 firm-years) for the single-classed 
companies in the IRRC sample from 1996 to 2001.
4    
The initial ownership data comes from the Compact Disclosure CD-ROMs. Based on 
the results of Anderson and Lee (1997a, 1997b) we build our sample from the information on 
large shareholders that Compact Disclosure derives directly from the proxies and ignore the 
insider-trading data that is also available through Compact Disclosure. Appendix B provides 
details on the construction of the initial database.  
We next check the initial database by comparing the Compact Disclosure data to the 
original proxy statements, which we obtain from Livedgar,
5 making changes to the 
ownership percentages of large shareholders where appropriate. All firms in the sample were 
checked – even those with no reported  blockholders in Compact Disclosure.  We employ the 
following general rules when deciding on share ownership. The SEC defines beneficial 
ownership as either voting or investment power, and sometimes companies report both 
measures in their proxies. We use voting power as opposed to investment power for our 
database when a distinction is made between the two. Also, even if individuals disclaim 
beneficial ownership of some portion of their holdings in the proxy, we treat these holdings 
as if the individual had the voting power. Under the terms of SEC Rule 13d-3, shares of 
common stock that may be acquired within 60 days are deemed outstanding for the purposes 
of computing the percentage of common stock owned by a shareholder. We follow this SEC 
rule and include these options. In the rare cases of a company having a temporary ownership 
structure resulting from a recent merger or acquisition, we remove these companies from our 
                                                 
4 The dual-class companies are analyzed in a companion paper, Gompers et al. (2004), where we attempt to 
build a comprehensive sample of all dual-class companies with any share-class trading on any major exchange 
in the United States.  
5 Livedgar is an online data service, provided by Global Securities Information, Inc., that enables users to obtain 
source documents as filed with the SEC.  
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sample for that year. For 229 (2.9%) sample firms, proxy information could not be obtained, 
and these firm-years were removed from our sample. Our final sample consists thus of 7,649 
firm-years and covers 1,913 unique firms. Table 1 shows summary statistics of our sample 
firms. The table is based on cross-sectional averages of time-series means. 
Many researchers are interested in knowing whether a specific blockholder is an 
“insider” or an “outsider” to the firm.  The role of large shareholders in corporate governance 
is often treated differently depending on the classification of the shareholder.  Since our work 
required the examination of all blockholders, the marginal cost of coding these classifications 
was relatively low, so we did so.  The results are summarized in Table 2. The possible 
classifications are (1) officer, (2) director, (3) affiliated entity, (4) ESOP, and (5) outside 
blockholder.  Category (1) includes all officers, even if they are also directors.  Category (2) 
only includes non-officer directors.  Category (3) includes any individual, trust, or company 
whose voting outcome is partially influenced, but not completely controlled, by an officer or 
director of the company. If the shares are completely controlled by the officer or director, 
then these shares would be counted under category (1) or (2), respectively. Category (4) is 
the aggregate number shares held by Employee Share Ownership Plans, but does not include 
employee shares held through non-ESOP retirement plans (such as non-ESOP 401(k) plans). 
Category (5) includes all blockholders not elsewhere classified.  This final category makes up 
about two-thirds of the aggregate amount of blockholding, and will be examined in the 
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B. Problems with the Compact Disclosure Data 
Two main biases are introduced if researchers were to work directly with the 
benchmark Compact Disclosure database: overlaps and preferred shares. The SEC requires 
that all beneficial owners of more than 5% of a company’s common stock be listed in the 
proxy, and consequently shares are often double or triple counted under different people or 
entities.
6 While the SEC requires firms to detail the ownership structure of jointly held block 
in the footnotes, Compact Disclosure ignores all of the footnotes detailing joint or cross 
ownership of shares and lists every blockholder and ownership percentage exactly as it 
appears in the summary table of the proxy section “Security Ownership of Management and 
Certain Beneficial Owners.” This leads to the overlap of reported ownership, which might be 
either a full overlap or a partial overlap. Examples of these two cases are documented below 
in Subsection 1. Second, Compact Disclosure sometimes misrepresents preferred shares as 
common equity ownership.  This problem is illustrated below in Subsection 2.   
 
1. Overlaps  
Full overlaps can arise in two types of situations. In the first scenario, two or more 
blockholders are listed in the ownership table with the same shareholdings and the joint 
ownership of these shares is disclosed only by the footnotes. In the second scenario, the 
proxy separates the beneficial ownership of directors and officers from that of large 
shareholders and Compact Disclosure reproduces entries from both tables without cross-
checking identities. Figures 1 and 2 display an example of the latter case. Figure 1 shows the 
Compact Disclosure data for Coca Cola Co. from the October 1999 CD, and Figure 2 shows 
an excerpt of the proxy statement from March 4th, 1999 on which the data is based. While 
                                                 
6 See Appendix A for details of these disclosure requirements.  
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Compact Disclosure’s blockholder data is accurate in a literal sense with respect to the two 
tables in the proxy, the vital information of the proxy footnote is ignored. Figure 1 lists 
Berkshire Hathaway and Warren Buffett individually as 8.10% owners of the common stock. 
Referring to the footnote 4 of Figure 1 (the ownership table from the proxy statement), we 
find that all of the shares listed under Warren Buffett are owned indirectly through Berkshire 
Hathaway. Tallying the beneficial ownership percentages without referencing the table 
footnotes in the proxy would suggest that 22.3% of Coca Cola’s common stock is held by 
blockholders when actually 14.2% is the correct figure. 
Overlaps are not always easy to recognize. In the second and more common scenario, 
multiple blockholders have joint-ownership of stock but also own shares over which they 
have sole voting or investment power. This type of overlap does not result in identical 
ownership figures for multiple shareholders. For example, there is no obvious overlap in the 
Compact Disclosure listing for Outback Steakhouse, Inc. (Figure 3).  However, footnotes 1, 2 
and 4 to the proxy beneficial ownership table (Figure 4) reveal that 8,242,125 shares 
(16.85%) owned by Multi-Venture Partners, Ltd.  are also listed under Chris T. Sullivan, 
Robert D. Basham, and J. Timothy Gannon. This means that beneficial owners hold 26.98% 
of the common stock, rather than 77.53%, which is the straightforward sum of Compact 
Disclosure’s ownership statistics. Note that the Spectrum data does not report the 5% 
blockholders correctly. At the bottom of Figure 3, where the Spectrum data is listed after the 
delimiter ‘***^’, it is stated that there are five 5% owners who hold an aggregate of 62.06% 
of common stock. 
Both of the above examples are relatively easy to spot and correct. However, many 
companies have more complex overlaps which translate into more detailed footnotes and  
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longer amounts of time that a researcher must spend examining them.   These types of 
overlaps include those among companies, subsidiaries, individuals, and trusts.  When the 
information in the footnotes is insufficient to determine the ultimate control of these shares, 
we follow the rule of assigning these shares to the partial owner who is closest to control of 
the company: officers first, then directors, and then outsiders. 
 
2) Preferred Stock 
There are two ways in which preferred shares can erroneously enter into the 
beneficial ownership figures. A company may report ownership of common stock and 
preferred stock separately but side by side in the same proxy table. In this case, Compact 
Disclosure will pick up all of the percentages in the table without distinguishing between the 
two categories of stock, giving us two different ownership figures for shareholders holding 
both preferred and common stock. Figure 5 shows one example from the original Compact 
Disclosure database, and Figure 6 shows the corresponding proxy statement. Some 
companies structure their proxy statements by listing common and preferred ownership side 
by side, but also giving an aggregated ownership figure. In these cases, Compact Disclosure 
tends to erroneously pick up just the aggregate ownership figure, without doing any 
adjustment for the relative voting power between the common and preferred.  In our 
corrected data, we include only the common-stock component of voting. 
 
C. The Corrected Data 
The first four rows of Table 3 show the frequency of the corrections we made by 
groups of overall shares held by blockholders. Using a non-parametric Wilcoxon difference  
 
 
   11
 
test, we show that the corrected and raw percentages of rows three and four are statistically 
different for all 6 groups of blockholders at the one percent level. The remainder of Table 3 
shows the frequency of each of the problems. It is evident from Table 3 that the overlap 
problem becomes more pronounced the higher is the overall share of common stock held by 
blockholders.  For companies where the reported ownership in Compact Disclosure is 
between five and ten percent, the frequency of errors is 0.4 percent.  This error rate rises to 
4.5 percent for the 10-15 percent ownership range, 8.5 percent for the 15-25 percent range, 
13.5 percent for the 25-50 percent range, and 53.1 percent for the >50% range.  The category 
with no reported blockholders in Compact Disclosure is a special case: there, the 31.7 
percent of errors is caused by either Compact Disclosure erroneously reporting no 
blockholder or by the company choosing to omit a blockholder table from the proxy, and 
instead putting blockholder information into the text.   
Errors tend to increase with aggregate blockholdings in Compact Disclosure for the 
simple reason that the errors themselves tend to increase the aggregates: e.g., an overlap for a 
jointly held block of 25 percent will lead to a Compact Disclosure aggregate of 50 percent.   
While the errors are rare for low levels of aggregate holdings, they are common at higher 
levels and are economically significant.  In the most extreme category (>50% in Compact 
Disclosure), the average holdings in the raw data for firms with errors fall from over 100 
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III.  A Representative Analysis:  Outside Blockholders and Firm Value 
In this section, we analyze the relationship between firm value and outside blockholdings 
using both raw and cleaned data.  Specifically, for each year t, we estimate 
 
Qit = a + b1OWNit + b2OWN
2
it + cXit + eit,     (1) 
 
where Q is a measure of industry-adjusted Tobin’s Q, OWN and OWN
2 are the fraction and 
fraction squared held by outside blockholders, X is a vector of control variables, and e is an 
iid error term, all measured for firm i at time t.   We follow Kaplan and Zingales (1997) and 
measure Q as the ratio of the market value of assets to the book value of assets:  the market 
value is calculated as the sum of the book value of assets and the market value of common 
stock less the book value of common stock and deferred taxes.  The X vector includes a 
Delaware incorporation dummy (Daines, 2001), an S&P 500 inclusion dummy (Morck and 
Yang, 2001), the log of sales for the previous fiscal year, and the log of firm age (months 
since first public listing).     
We make no claims for any causal relationship here.  Any regression of firm value on 
ownership will be fraught with endogeneity concerns, a point first made by Demsetz and 
Lehn (1985) and followed up by many other authors.
7  Rather, we intend only to test whether 
all this cleaning effort yields any meaningful differences in coefficient estimates or statistical 
significance.  To do so, we start with a simple and obvious regression.   
  Table 4 summarizes the results of regression (1) estimated separately for each year 
from 1996 to 2001, with each regression estimated using both raw and cleaned data.  The 
results suggest that the raw data is much noisier, as the coefficients on the OWN variables are 
                                                 
7 For examples, see Loderer and Martin (1997), Himmelberg et al. (1999), Palia (2001), and Coles et al. (2003).   
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almost always closer to zero and lower in statistically significance than are the corresponding 
coefficients using cleaned data.   Overall, the cleaned data demonstrate a far more robust 
relationship between outside block ownership and firm value.  While the economic 
interpretation of this result is clouded by endogeneity concerns, the research importance of 
using the cleaned data is clear.  
 
IV. Conclusion 
  Researchers rely on ownership data for many studies.  The lack of a standardized 
source of data on large blockholders is an impediment to this work.  In this paper, we 
document the weaknesses with the commonly used data, show how to fix them, and 
demonstrate that these fixes are both quantitatively large and also important for the analysis 




Appendix A – Legal Rules   
The Securities Exchange Act of 1934, rules 13d-1 to 13d-7 (§240.13d) and rules 16a-
1 to 16e-1 (§240.16a-e), contain the legal definitions and filing requirements for what the 
corporate finance literature has termed “blockholders”.  While 13D defines beneficial 
ownership and describes the disclosure requirements of these shareholders, rules 16a-e detail 
the reporting requirements on transactions made by corporate insiders. The company in turn 
is required to disclose blockholder information to shareholders via proxies under Regulation 
and Schedule 14a (§240.14a), commonly called the “proxy” statement. 
Rule 13d-1(a) sets the threshold for beneficial ownership at 5% or more of a class of 
stock.  According to Rule 13d-3(a) a beneficial owner “includes any person who, directly or  
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indirectly, through any contract, understanding, relationship, or otherwise, has or shares” 
voting or investment power.  This rule has been interpreted to include shares that may be 
obtained through the exercising of options, warrants, or rights in the next 60 days a part of 
the beneficial ownership calculation.  Any individual or group that has acquired a beneficial 
stake in a class of equity is required to file the form SC 13D [see rule 13d-1(a)]. According to 
Rule 13d-3(a), the form SC 13D must be filed within 10 days after the acquisition of the 
equity position, and any material change in the position must be promptly filed in an 
amended SC 13D [see 13d-1(a)]
8. This form contains information about the person’s 
relationship with the company and the nature of the holding. A select category of “persons” 
such as banks, brokers and dealers, and insurance companies can file an abbreviated form, 
the SC 13G. The SC 13G can only be used if the equity securities were acquired in the 
ordinary course of business, and without the purpose or effect of changing or influencing the 
control of the issuer [see 13d-1(b)]. 
Rule 13d-3 details how to determine beneficial ownership. For the purposes of 
sections 13(d) and 13(g) of the Act, a beneficial owner of a security includes any person who, 
directly or indirectly has or shares either voting or investment power over the security. Rule 
13d-3 also specifies that creating trusts or pooling arrangements are not valid constructs to 
avoid filing a form 13D. In fact, rule 13d-3(c) specifies, “all securities of the same class 
beneficially owned by a person, regardless of the form which such beneficial ownership 
takes, shall be aggregated in calculating the number of shares beneficially owned by such 
person”.  Rule 13d-7 regulates the dissemination of form 13D. For our purposes, it is 
important that the issuer of the security must be notified of the existence of a large 
shareholder at its principal executive office, by registered or certified mail.  
                                                 
8 According to rule 13d-2(a), The SEC deems a 1% change in the ownership position as material.  
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The second set of laws of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 regulating filing 
requirements for blockholders is detailed in rules 16a-1 to 16e-1 (“Reports of Directors, 
Officers, and Principal Shareholders”). Pursuant to this section, a person (“principal 
shareholder”) deemed a beneficial owner of more than 10% of any class of equity securities 
registered under section 12 of the Act (“Registration Requirements for Securities”), as well 
as any director or officer of the company needs to file forms 3, 4, and 5. Initial statements of 
beneficial ownership of equity securities required by section 16(a) of the Act are filed on 
Form 3. Statements of changes in beneficial ownership required by that section are filed on 
Form 4, and annual statements are filed on Form 5. While the 13D/G forms are laid out to 
disclose the size and nature of the holdings of a large blockholder (who owns more than five 
percent, what their purpose is, whether they intend to buy more, their voting power, etc.), the 
3,4,5 forms are structured to disclose any transactions made by a company insider. Without 
discussing anything about the intent of the shareholder, the 3,4,5 forms list what was bought 
or sold and when, making them more transaction oriented than disclosure oriented.  
The laws regulating a company’s disclosure requirements of large blockholder 
information to shareholders are detailed in Regulation 14A (“Solicitation of Proxies”) and 
Schedule 14A of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (§240.14a). Pursuant to Schedule 
14A(6-d) with reference to Item 403 of Regulation S-K (§229.403) entitled “Security 
Ownership of Certain Beneficial Owners and Management,” a company is required to 
disclose two types of tables in proxies: one listing shareholders who own more than 5% of 
any class of the company’s equity securities, and another listing any ownership of equity 
securities by all directors and officers of the company. The tables can be combined at the 
company’s option and should list the number of shares beneficially owned and the  
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percentage of the class owned. Item 403 does specify a tabular format to be used, but it does 
not specify the location where this information should appear in the proxy. Item 403 also 
explains that a company may rely on the information disclosed in the SC 13D/G forms by 
beneficial owners when preparing this information for proxies.  
Item 403 refers to Rule 13d-3 for the determination of beneficial ownership, and it 
details specific guidelines for disclosing the nature of the beneficial ownership. Information 
in sub-columns or footnotes must be included and reflect the number of shares of which a 
beneficial owner has sole or shared voting power as well as sole or shared investment power. 
Similarly, the number of shares a beneficial owner has the right to acquire must be listed in a 
footnote, as well as any arrangements or pledges that could lead to a change of control of 
shares.  Item 403 also specifies that a company must use appropriate disclosure to avoid 
confusion where more than one beneficial owner is listed for the same securities. When a 
beneficial owner owns shares pursuant to a voting trust or agreement, the company must state 
in a table or footnote the title of the securities, the amount held or to be held according to the 
trust or agreement, and the duration of the agreement. The company must also disclose the 
names and addresses of the voting trustees and outline briefly their voting rights and powers 
under the trust or agreement. 
 
Appendix B – Details on the Sample Construction 
In a first step, we matched the IRRC database with data from Compact Disclosure 
pertaining to large shareholders and directors and officers. Compact Disclosure stores 
company data on CDs that are updated monthly. The month of the update depends on the 
company’s fiscal year end, and, for data pertaining to the board of directors, on the  
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company’s proxy meeting date. Since Compact Disclosure often does not keep information 
until the next update, but rather removes stale data from the monthly CDs, searching the right 
month after the proxy meeting is important. In the earlier sample years, a lag of 6 months 
from proxy meeting month to issuance of data CD yielded the most reliable results. Starting 
in 2000, Compact Disclosure data are usually updated in the month following the annual 
meeting.  
We then sort, for each sample year, all IRRC firms by proxy meeting month. We 
download through a ticker merge the large shareholder data (field SH) and information on 
directors (field DO) and officers (field NA) from the appropriate monthly Compact 
Disclosure CD in the tagged format. Figure 1 shows an example of our raw database. The 
search string automatically yields a summary of the insider-trading data compiled by 
Spectrum (Form 3, 4, and 5), which we discard.
9 Note from Figure 1 that Compact 
Disclosure mentions the source and source date of the director and ownership information in 
parentheses. We control in the sample construction that all ownership information is taken 
from proxy statements. We are able to match 94% of all firm-years with our search strategy 
through Compact Disclosure. The remaining firms were looked up directly from the proxies. 
In a next step, we use a SAS program to convert the data of Figure 1 into an easy-to-
use SAS database. The SAS program loops through the information on officers and directors, 
provided by Compact Disclosure in the fields NA- and DO-, and identifies a large 
                                                 
9 Anderson and Lee (1997a) caution that the proxy’s definition of an insider (an officer or director) is not the 
same as the definition used for the insider-trading filings (any shareholder of 10% or more) compiled by 
Spectrum.  When they compare Spectrum data to the benchmark proxy data on management ownership, they 
find that 40.7% of their sample has a reporting discrepancy of over 5% (p. 316). They also refute the claim that 
the Spectrum data are more current than the most recent proxy data, showing that the filing dates listed in the 
Spectrum section of the Compact Disclosure data are sometimes “stale” by two or more years (Anderson and 
Lee (1997b), p. 3-4). An additional concern for us is a date mismatch, as the Spectrum data is updated at various 
points during the year, while the director’s database stems from the annual proxy statements. Indeed, the 
Spectrum data of Figure 1 is incorrect.   
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shareholder entry as either director or officer if the character string for a blockholder (in the 
SH- section of the Compact Disclosure data) matched a character string in the officer or 
director sections (NA-, DO-) of the data. Compact Disclosure is extremely accurate and 
consistent in the spelling of names across fields, as it takes the names exactly as they appear 
in the proxy statements.
10 
 
                                                 
10 However, the automated process will not correctly match variations such as “The Smith family trust” with a 
director named Peter H. Smith. These corrections are done manually in the data cleaning process.  
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Table 1 





















Firm Age (in years)
Market Value
Assets - Total (MM$)
Sales (Net) (MM$)












% Employee Directors  
 
 
The table describes summary statistics of key sample firm characteristics. The sample period 
is 1996 – 2001. The total sample consists of large publicly listed U.S. firms, a total of 7,649 
firm-years and 1,913 unique firms. The table contains cross-sectional means and medians of 
firm time-series averages. Firm age is measured as months since first listing. Market value, 
total assets, sales, and common equity are taken from Compustat. The book-to-market ratio is 
book value of common equity to market value of common equity. Book value of common 
equity is the sum of book common equity (Compustat item 60) and deferred taxes (item 74). 
The capex-to-sales ratio is capital expenditures (item 128) divided by net sales. Q is the 
market value of assets divided by the book value of assets (item 6), where the market value 
of assets is computed as book value of assets plus the market value of common stock less the 
sum of the book value of common stock (item 60) and balance sheet deferred taxes (item 74). 
All book values for fiscal year t (from Compustat) are combined with the market value of 
common equity at the calendar end of year t. Return on assets (equity) is calculated as 
income before extraordinary items (item 18) divided by item 6 (item 60). G-score is an equal 
weighted index that measures the restrictions of shareholder rights, and is provided through 
Wharton Research Data Services (WRDS). All director variables are from the director 
database of the Investor Responsibility Research Center (IRRC).   
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Table 2 
Affiliation of Large Shareholders 
 
 
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
Total Firms in Sample 1,130 1,046 1,510 1,387 1,336 1,240
Number of Blockholders 2.12 2.10 2.41 2.44 2.53 2.50
Sum of Blockholdings (%) 21.7% 21.3% 24.5% 24.9% 25.5% 25.0%
Held by 
Officers
Number 0.16 0.15 0.20 0.20 0.21 0.20
% Held 2.2% 2.1% 2.7% 2.7% 2.8% 2.5%
Directors
Number 0.09 0.10 0.11 0.12 0.12 0.11
% Held 1.1% 1.1% 1.3% 1.4% 1.5% 1.3%
Affiliated entities
Number 0.14 0.14 0.13 0.14 0.13 0.13
% Held 2.6% 2.5% 2.3% 2.2% 2.0% 2.1%
ESOPs
Number 0.12 0.13 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.10
% Held 1.3% 1.3% 0.9% 0.9% 1.0% 1.0%
Outside Blockholders
Number 1.60 1.58 1.87 1.90 1.97 1.97
% Held 14.4% 14.3% 17.2% 17.7% 18.2% 18.0%  
 
The first three rows of this table contain summary statistics for the cleaned sample by 
calendar year. The sample construction is explained in Appendix B. The bottom part of the 
table shows the frequency of each category of large shareholders. Officers are officers, and 
possibly also directors of the firm. Directors are all non-officer directors. Affiliated entities 
are individuals, trusts or companies whose voting outcome is at least partially influenced or 
outright determined by an officer or director of the company. ESOPs are Employee Stock 
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Table 3 
Occurrence of Full and Partial Overlap and Wrong Attribution of Preferred Shares 
 
 
no  BH 5-10% 10-15% 15-25% 25-50% >50% Total
Overall Sample
No. of Firms before cleaning 1,365 802 738 1,469 2,251 1,024 7,649
% of Firms that required cleaning  31.7% 0.4% 4.5% 8.5% 13.5% 53.1% 18.8%
% Held as Blocks before cleaning 0.0% 7.0% 12.6% 19.9% 35.4% 82.4% 27.2%
after cleaning 7.9% 6.9% 12.4% 19.5% 33.6% 52.6% 24.0%
Situations that required cleaning:
Full Overlap 0 0 1 20 47 122 190
% Held as Blocks before cleaning 14.8% 21.3% 37.6% 99.9%
after cleaning 6.9% 14.6% 24.2% 48.6%
Partial Overlap 0 0 5 43 216 377 641
% Held as Blocks before cleaning 12.0% 21.6% 39.8% 97.3%
after cleaning 6.2% 14.0% 27.4% 47.4%
Preferred Shares 0 3 10 11 12 79 115
% Held as Blocks before cleaning 6.4% 12.6% 18.8% 34.1% 125.8%
after cleaning 0.0% 3.2% 12.2% 11.5% 26.2%
Other 433 0 22 25 24 22 526
% Held as Blocks before cleaning 0.0% 12.2% 19.8% 36.1% 85.4%
after cleaning 24.7% 11.9% 19.0% 28.5% 42.2%
Overall sample after cleaning
Number of firms by category 963 952 854 1,640 2,518 722 7,649
% Held as Blocks by category 0% 7% 13% 20% 35% 62% 24.0%
Fraction of Common Stock Held by Large Shareholders
 
This table reports the occurrence of the four problems associated with using the raw large 
shareholder database available through Compact Disclosure. We classify the firms into six 
different categories based on the sum of the blockholdings. The first row shows the number 
of firms by blockholding category. The second row shows the fraction of entries by category 
that needed to be corrected. The third and fourth row contain the average sum of 
blockholdings by category before and after cleaning, where the categorization is done by the 
sum of blockholdings as they appear in the raw data. The second part of the table describes 
the four situations that required cleaning. The four problems are full overlap, partial overlap, 
the treatment of preferred shares, and other problems. The second and third row of each 
reported problem show how the percentage holdings change given we observe the problem.   
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Table 4 
Q Regressions Using Raw Compact Disclosure and Our Cleaned Data 
 
This table presents the coefficients of the sum of outside blockholdings and squared outside 
blockholdings, before and after our cleaning procedure, from annual cross-sectional 
regressions of industry-adjusted Tobin's Q on the blockholdings and control variables. The 
control variables include a Delaware dummy, S&P 500 affiliation, the natural logarithm of 
firm age in months (measured as months since first listing, obtained from CRSP), and the 
natural logarithm of firm sales (obtained from Compustat). For simplicity, the coefficients on 
the control variables are omitted from the table. Standard errors are reported in parentheses 
and significance at the one-percent and five-percent levels is indicated by ** and * 
respectively. Entries in bold demonstrate a difference in statistical significance between the 
raw Compact Disclosure and the cleaned data. Q is the ratio of the market value of assets to 
the book value of assets: the market value is calculated as the sum of the book value of assets 
and the market value of common stock less the book value of common stock and deferred 
taxes. The market value of equity is measured at the end of the current calendar year, and the 
accounting variables are measured in the current fiscal year. Industry adjustments are made 
by subtracting the industry median, where medians are calculated by matching the four-digit 
SIC codes from December of each year to the 48 industries designated by Fama and French 
[1997].  
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
Raw Compact Disclosure data
Intercept 2.78** 2.98** 4.22** 5.44** 6.15**  3.09** 
(0.40) (0.44) (0.50) (0.75) (0.63) (0.31)
% held through outside blocks -1.04*    -1.10* -0.81 -1.85**  -2.46**  -0.96** 
(0.44) (0.46) (0.46) (0.72) (0.70) (0.30)
% held through outside 0.71 0.89 0.44 0.89 1.85*    0.43
 blocks squared (0.60) (0.58) (0.34) (0.62) (0.72) (0.28)
Cleaned data 
Intercept 2.95** 3.19** 4.59** 5.94**  6.73** 3.42** 
(0.41) (0.44) (0.52) (0.77) (0.65) (0.32)
% held through outside blocks -1.45*     -2.25** -2.69** -4.49** -4.78**  -2.15** 
(0.65) (0.70) (0.91) (1.33) (1.09) (0.54)
% held through outside 0.96 2.33 3.29*    5.60**  5.75**  1.98*   
 blocks squared (1.24) (1.35) (1.57) (2.22) (1.80) (0.93) 
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Figure 1 








NA- (SOURCE: 10K)^ 
    IVESTER, M. DOUGLAS/ 51/  CHAIRMAN OF THE BOARD, CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER,  
    EXECUTIVE VICE PRESIDENT (PRX 03-04-99)  / $12,872,587^ 
    CHESTNUT, JAMES E./ 48/  GENERAL OFFICER (PRX 03-04-99)  / NA^ 
    STAHL, JACK L./ 46/  GENERAL OFFICER (PRX 03-04-99)  / NA^ 
    DAFT, DOUGLAS N./ 56/  GENERAL OFFICER (PRX 03-04-99)  / NA^ 
    WARE, CARL/ 55/  SENIOR VICE PRESIDENT, GROUP PRESIDENT / NA^ 
    HAAS, TIMOTHY J./ 52/  SENIOR VICE PRESIDENT, GROUP PRESIDENT / NA^ 
    COOPER, RALPH H./ 59/  GENERAL OFFICER (PRX 03-04-99)  / NA^ 
    CASEY, WILLIAM P./ 58/  SENIOR VICE PRESIDENT, GROUP PRESIDENT / NA^ 
    GLADDEN, JOSEPH R., JR./ 56/  SENIOR VICE PRESIDENT, LEGAL COUNSEL / NA^ 
    FRENETTE, CHARLES S./ 46/  SENIOR VICE PRESIDENT / NA^ 
    AMON, ANTON/ 55/  SENIOR VICE PRESIDENT, MANAGER / NA^ 
    GOURLAY, GEORGE/ 57/  SENIOR VICE PRESIDENT, MANAGER / NA^ 
    WALTERS, MICHAEL W./ 52/  VICE PRESIDENT / NA^ 
    SHAW, SUSAN E./ NA/  SECRETARY (PRX 03-04-99)  / NA| 
 
DO- (SOURCE: PROXY 03/04/1999)^ 
    IVESTER, M. DOUGLAS/ 51/  CHAIRMAN OF THE BOARD, CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER,  
    EXECUTIVE VICE PRESIDENT / $12,872,587^ 
    ALLEN, HERBERT A./ 59/  DIRECTOR / NA^ 
    ALLEN, RONALD W./ 57/  DIRECTOR / NA^ 
    BLACK, CATHLEEN P./ 54/  NA/ NA^ 
    BUFFETT, WARREN E./ 68/  NA/ NA^ 
    KING, SUSAN B./ 58/  NA/ NA^ 
    MCHENRY, DONALD F./ 62/  DIRECTOR / NA^ 
    NUNN, SAM/ 60/  DIRECTOR / NA^ 
    OREFFICE, PAUL F./ 71/  DIRECTOR / NA^ 
    ROBINSON, JAMES DIXON, III/ 63/  DIRECTOR / NA^ 
    UEBERROTH, PETER V./ 61/  DIRECTOR / NA^ 
    WILLIAMS, JAMES B./ 65/  DIRECTOR / NA| 
 
SH-  
    BUFFETT, WARREN E.,  8.10% (PRX 03-04-99)^ 
    SUNTRUST BANKS INC,  6.10% (PRX  03-04-99)^ 
    BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY INC,  8.10% (PRX 03-04-99)^ 
 
        ***^ 
      TYPE          DATE(Q,M)    OWNERS    CHANGE (000S) HELD  %OWN^ 
      INSTITUTIONS  03/31/1999(Q)    1        NIL         NIL  0.00^ 
      5% OWNERS     05/31/1999(M)    0         NA           0  0.00^ 
      INSIDERS      05/31/1999(M)    0         NA           0  0.00 || 
 
 
This figure reproduces the results of a string search of the October 1999 Compact Disclosure 
CD ROM. The database was searched based on Ticker Symbol, and the fields CO – company 
name, TS – Ticker Symbol, CU – Cusip number, NA – Officers, DO – Directors, and SH – 
large shareholders were requested in the tagged format. Below the symbol “***^” at the 
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Figure 2 
Beneficial Ownership Table from the March 4th, 1999 Proxy of Coca Cola Co. 
 
 
  The following table sets forth information regarding beneficial ownership of 
Company Common Stock by each Director, the Company's five most highly 
compensated executive officers and the Directors and executive officers of the 
Company as a group, all as of February 22, 1999. 
                                                  AGGREGATE NUMBER   PERCENT OF 
                                                     OF SHARES       OUTSTANDING 
NAME                                             BENEFICIALLY OWNED  SHARES/18/ 
----                                             ------------------  ----------- 
                                                                         
Herbert A. Allen................................      9,368,875/1/         * 
Ronald W. Allen.................................         13,194/2/         * 
Cathleen P. Black ..............................         15,541/3/         * 
Warren E. Buffett...............................    200,004,396/4/       8.1% 
Susan B. King...................................         12,915/5/         * 
Donald F. McHenry...............................         29,023/6/         * 
Sam Nunn........................................          2,039/7/         * 
Paul F. Oreffice................................        109,252/8/         * 
James D. Robinson III...........................         16,298/9/         * 
Peter V. Ueberroth..............................         88,605/10/        * 
James B. Williams...............................    106,053,931/11/      4.3% 
M. Douglas Ivester..............................      5,334,915/12/        * 
Jack L. Stahl...................................      1,282,326/13/        * 
Douglas N. Daft.................................        969,748/14/        * 
James E. Chestnut...............................        437,379/15/        * 
Ralph H. Cooper.................................      1,031,801/16/        * 
All Directors and Executive Officers as a 
 Group (25 Persons) ............................    329,575,298/17/     13.4% 
-------- 
[...] 
/4/ Shares owned indirectly through subsidiaries of Berkshire Hathaway Inc., 
the capital stock of which is owned 31.5% by Mr. Buffett and three trusts of 
which he is trustee but in which he has no beneficial interest and 2.4% by his 
wife. Also includes 4,396 phantom shares accrued under the Deferred 
Compensation Plan for Non-Employee Directors. 
[...]  
 
SECTION 16(A) BENEFICIAL OWNERSHIP REPORTING COMPLIANCE 
  
PRINCIPAL SHARE OWNERS 
  
  Set forth in the table below is information as of December 31, 1998 with 
respect to persons known to the Company to be the beneficial owners of more 
than five percent of the Company's issued and outstanding stock: 
  
                                                      NUMBER OF SHARES      PERCENT 
                  NAME AND ADDRESS                   BENEFICIALLY OWNED     OF CLASS 
                  ----------------                   ------------------     -------- 
                                                                                
   Berkshire Hathaway Inc./1/                           200,000,000           8.1% 
    1440 Kiewit Plaza  
    Omaha, Nebraska 68131 
   SunTrust Banks, Inc./2/                              151,135,261           6.1% 
    303 Peachtree Street 
    Atlanta, Georgia 30308 
-------- 
  /1/ Berkshire Hathaway Inc., a diversified holding company, has informed the 
Company that certain of its subsidiaries hold an aggregate of 200,000,000 
shares of Company Common Stock. The capital stock of Berkshire Hathaway Inc. 
is beneficially owned 31.5% by Warren E. Buffett and three trusts of which he 
is a trustee but in which he has no beneficial interest and 2.4% by his wife. 
All of such shares of the Company are included in the share ownership of Mr. 
Buffett disclosed in the table of beneficial ownership of securities above. 
 
  /2/ [...]   
 
 
   27
 
Figure 3 








DO- (SOURCE: PROXY 03/13/98)^ 
    SULLIVAN, CHRIS T./ 50/  CHAIRMAN OF THE BOARD, CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER / $400,000^ 
    BASHAM, ROBERT D./ 50/  PRESIDENT, CHIEF OPERATING OFFICER / $400,000^ 
    MERRITT, ROBERT S./ 46/  CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER, SENIOR VICE PRESIDENT, TREASURER /  
    $270,000^ 
    BRABSON, JOHN A., JR./ 57/  DIRECTOR  (10-Q 06-30-98)/ NA^ 
    BRIDGES, CHARLES H./ 67/  DIRECTOR  (10-Q 06-30-98)/ NA^ 
    GANNON, J. TIMOTHY/ 49/  SENIOR VICE PRESIDENT, DIRECTOR  (10-Q 06-30-98)/$290,000^ 
    SELMON, LEE ROY/ 43/  DIRECTOR  (10-Q 06-30-98)/ NA^ 
    CAREY, W. R., JR./ 50/  DIRECTOR / NA^ 
    FIELDS-ROSE, DEBBI/ 41/  DIRECTOR / NA^ 
    FLOM, EDWARD L./ 68/  DIRECTOR / NA^ 
    SCHNEID, NANCY/ 39/  DIRECTOR / NA^ 
    WILT, TOBY S./ 53/  DIRECTOR / NA^ 
    AVERY, PAUL E./ 38/  SENIOR VICE PRESIDENT, DIRECTOR  (10-Q 06-30-98)/$579,213^ 
    FIELDS, DEBBI/ 41/  DIRECTOR (PRX 03-13-98)  / NA^ 




    BASHAM, ROBERT D.,  17.09% (PRX 03-13-98)^ 
    SULLIVAN, CHRIS T.,  17.39% (PRX  03-13-98)^ 
    GANNON, TIMOTHY J.,  17.12% (PRX 03-13-98)^ 
    MULTI VENTURE PARTNERS  LTD,  16.85% (PRX 03-13-98)^ 
    T ROWE PRICE ASSOCIATES INC,  9.08% (PRX 03-13-98)^ 
 
        ***^ 
      TYPE          DATE(Q,M)  OWNERS    CHANGE (000S) HELD  %OWN^ 
      INSTITUTIONS  06/30/98(Q)  152      1,406      31,204 63.68^ 
      5% OWNERS     09/30/98(M)    5         NA      30,409 62.06^ 






This figure reproduces the results of a string search of the September 1998 Compact 
Disclosure CD ROM. The database was searched based on Ticker Symbol, and the fields CO 
– company name, TS – Ticker Symbol, DO – Directors, CU – Cusip number, and SH – large 
shareholders were requested in the tagged format. Below the symbol “***^” at the bottom, 
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Figure 4 
Beneficial Ownership Table from March 13




SECURITY OWNERSHIP OF CERTAIN BENEFICIAL OWNERS AND MANAGEMENT 
 
The following table sets forth certain information regarding the beneficial 
ownership of the Company's Common Stock as of February 27, 1998 (except as noted) 
by each person known to the Company to own beneficially more than five percent of 
the Company's Common Stock, each director, each nominee for election as a director, 
each executive officer, and all executive officers and directors as a group. 
          
                                       Amount         Percent 
                                     Beneficially       of 
  Name of Beneficial Owner            Owned            Class 
                                                           
Chris T. Sullivan        ..............8,505,490       17.39%  1) 
Robert D. Basham        ...............8,360,875       17.09%  2) 
J. Timothy Gannon        ..............8,373,761       17.12%  3) 
[...] 
Multi-Venture Partners, Ltd.    .......8,242,125       16.85%  0) 




0) Multi-Venture Partners, Ltd. ("MVP") is an investment partnership formed by 
   Chris T. Sullivan, Robert D. Basham and J. Timothy Gannon. Messrs. Sullivan, 
   Basham and Gannon are the only limited partners in MVP and are the only  
   members of MVP's sole general partner, SBG Investments, L.L.C. ("SBG"), a  
   limited liability company.  
 
[...] 
1) Includes (i) 8,242,125 shares owned by MVP; (ii) 231,292 shares owned by  
   Sullivan Family Investments, Ltd., a family limited partnership of which Mr.  
   Sullivan serves as general partner; and (iii) 1,712 shares owned by Mr. Sul- 
   livan's children for whom Mr. Sullivan serves as custodian. Mr. Sullivan  
   shares voting and dispositive power with respect to Common Stock owned by   
   MVP 
 
2) Includes 8,242,125 shares owned by MVP. Mr. Basham shares voting and 
   dispositive power with respect to Common Stock owned by MVP. 
 
3) Includes 8,242,125 shares owned by MVP. Mr. Gannon shares voting and 
   dispositive power with respect to Common Stock owned by MVP. 
 
[...] 
4) Based on a Schedule 13G filed by T. Rowe Price Associates, Inc. ("T. Rowe  
   Price") with the Securities and Exchange Commission on February 10, 1998,  
   these securities are owned by various individual and institutional investors  
   for which T. Rowe Price serves as investment adviser with power to direct  
   invest-ments and/or sole power to vote the securities. For purposes of the  
   reporting requirements of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, T. Rowe Price  
   is deemed to be a beneficial owner of such securities; however, T. Rowe  
   Price expressly disclaims that it is, in fact, the beneficial owner of such  
   securities.  
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Figure 5 
Compact Disclosure’s 2000 Large Shareholder Data for Tribune Co. 
 





    NORTHERN TRUST CO,  9.10% (PRX 03-27-01)^ 
    NORTHERN TRUST CO,  100.00% (PRX  03-27-01)^ 
    ROBERT R MCCORMICK TRIBUNE FOUNDATION, E,  14.95% (PRX 03-27-01) ^ 




Beneficial Ownership Table from the March, 27
th, 2000 Proxy of Tribune Co. 
 
 
Principal Shareholders       
The following table sets forth information as of February 28, 2001 with respect 
to each person who is known to Tribune management to be the beneficial owner of 
more than 5% of any class of Tribune stock entitled to vote: 
 
               SERIES  B   
      COMMON  STOCK         PREFERRED  STOCK 
     --------------------         ---------------- 
 
NAME AND ADDRESS        NUMBER OF     PERCENT     NUMBER OF    PERCENT 
OF OWNER          SHARES        OF CLASS    SHARES       OF CLASS 
------------------------------------------   --------   ------------   ----------   --------- 
Robert R. McCormick Tribune Foundation 
  Cantigny Foundation(1)                  44,825,676  14.95%        --            -- 
  Room 770 
  435 North Michigan Avenue 
  Chicago, IL 60611 
 
The Chandler Trusts(2)                    36,861,190  12.29         --            -- 
  350 West Colorado Boulevard 
  Suite 230 
  Pasadena, CA 91105 
 
The Northern Trust Company(3)             28,962,648 (4)  9.10%      1,150,456      100% 
  50 South LaSalle Street 
  Chicago, IL 60675 
 
-------- 
(1) The investment and voting power of each of the Robert R. McCormick Tribune 
    Foundation and the Cantigny Foundation is vested in a board of six directors, 
    consisting of Dennis J. FitzSimons, Jack Fuller, John W. Madigan and three 




(3) On February 28, 2001, The Northern Trust Company, as ESOP trustee, held 
    2,046,670 shares of Tribune common stock on behalf of the ESOP and was deemed 
    to hold 18,407,296 shares of Tribune common stock into which the Tribune Series 
    B preferred stock is convertible, which shares are included in determining the 
    percent of class owned. All ownership attributed to Northern Trust in its capacity 
    as ESOP Trustee is shared with the participants in the ESOP. 
 
(4) Holdings based upon information contained in a Schedule 13G filed with the  
    Securities and Exchange Commission on February 8, 2001 by Northern Trust, which 
    indicated that Northern Trust had sole voting power with respect to 6,325,093 
    shares; shared voting power with respect to 22,553,329 shares; sole dispositive 
    power with respect to 6,029,468 shares; and shared dispositive power with 
    respect to 22,564,887 shares. 